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WAR AVERTERS: SEWARD, MALLORY,
AND FORT PICKENS
by ERNEST F. DIBBLE *
IN JANUARY  1861, the scene was set in Pensacola and thecurtain almost drawn for the first major military confronta-
tion of the Civil War. A crisis over federal property developed
in Florida, and except for Fort Pickens at Pensacola and Fort
Taylor in Key West, all government installations were seized.
In Pensacola, both sides expected hostilities to begin immedi-
ately. The navy yard at Warrington, Barrancas barracks, and
Fort McRee were taken peacefully, but Lieutenant Adam J.
Slemmer, in command of the Pensacola forts, removed all of his
men and as much equipment as possible from the other loca-
tions into the more strategically located Fort Pickens. At the
same time, Florida’s senators, David L. Yulee and Stephen R.
Mallory, were crystallizing their desire to capture Fort Pickens.
Senator Yulee echoed the thoughts of many others in stating
that “the naval station and forts at Pensacola are first in
consequence.” 1 Senator Mallory, on January 10, telegraphed
Colonel William H. Chase, in charge of the gathering rebel
forces in Pensacola, stating he expected Pickens and McRee
to be captured. 2 However, Colonel Chase did not push the
conquest, even though Lieutenant Slemmer sat in the il l-
prepared fort with only eighty-one men and refused to sur-
render. Chase advised Senator Mallory that the capture of
Pickens would have to involve a direct assault with many
casualties. In the face of this advice, rebelling leaders in
Washington conferred and decided not to attack Pickens. The
seceding states were poorly organized militarily and politically,
* Mr. Dibble is chairman of the faculty of history at the University of
West Florida.
1. David Levy Yulee to Joseph Finegan, quoted in “More Forts Seized,”
Atlanta Century, January 6, 1861.
2. William Watson Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida (New
York, 1913; facsimile edition, Gainesville, 1964), 79-80. The story of the
truce of Pickens is detailed by Davis, inspired perhaps by his having
been brought up in Pensacola. A more recent account is Richard N.
Current, Lincoln and the First Shot (Philadelphia, 1963).
[232]
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and were wooing the border states just as were the incoming
and outgoing federal administrations. Thus, for political rather
than military reasons, Yulee and Mallory telegraphed not to
attack Fort Pickens. Backed by senators from Texas, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, the Florida senators joined
in stating that Pickens was “not worth one drop of blood.” 3
This decision not to attack was confirmed and enhanced when
the warship Brooklyn sailed with two companies aboard to
reinforce the ill-manned Fort Pickens. The “Truce of Pickens”
was agreed upon on January 28, 1861, wherein the South would
not attack and the fort would not be reinforced. The Brooklyn
was ordered to stand by and not land troops. Thus a very
troubled truce began similar to the postponed confrontration
at Fort Sumter at Charleston. No time limit was set on this
executive agreement between the Buchanan administration and,
by then, private citizen Mallory.
Both sides had bought some time. 4 Jefferson Davis and a
majority of southern senators were not ready for war to start
in January over Fort Pickens. In spite of their collective opin-
ion, however, the truce was a source of real embarrassment to
Mallory. His appointment as secretary of the Confederate
navy was opposed because of his role in the truce. Mallory
himself, as secretary, stated that “it was a fatal error not to
have taken Pickins” [sic]. 5 He justified his position against the
“lying demogogues” by stating that he did all he could before
Slemmer retired to Pickens and that he was just a private
citizen who gave the administration “a fright.” 6
For President Buchanan, however, the Pickens true was
not only successful but consistent with other policies. 7 He had
3. War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate
Armies (Washington, 1880-1901), Series 1, Vol. 1, 445. Hereinafter re-
ferred to as Official Records.
4. John Bassett Moore, ed., Works of James Buchanan, 12 vols. (New
York, 1908-1911), XI, 285-86. Buchanan states that Scott and others
understood the truce to exist only for the duration of the Peace Con-
vention assembling in Washington. Others date the truce to March 3.
The best studies of the decisions on both sides to break the truce are
in John Shipley Tilley, Lincoln Takes Command (Chapel Hill, 1941),
and Grady McWhitney, Braxton Bragg and Confederate Defeat (New
York, 1969), I.
5. Stephen R. Mallory to unknown, March 22, 1861, American Historical
Review, XII (October 1906), 104.
6. Ibid., 104-08.
7. The Works of James Buchanan, XI, 285-86, implies that Pickens could
not have been defended and therefore the truce was a favorable one.
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already revealed a capacity to postpone decisions or showdown.
Believing that the states had no right to secede, he felt that the
federal government had no right to use force to keep them
from seceding. Therefore, the best solution to any problem
was to overlook or postpone. The troubled truce for Pickens
and Sumter saved Buchanan from decision and cascaded the
problem into Lincoln’s hands. When the President was inaugu-
rated, debate continued on federal policy. The fate of the
Pickens truce would be worked out as Lincoln decided, enun-
ciated, and enforced policy on all federal property in seceded
states. The President did not want to provoke conflict, but he
felt he had to do something other than make what he con-
sidered a total retreat from federal property. Lincoln also
believed pro-union strength would keep secession limited only
to the lower South. He listened to advice from many quarters,
including a persuasiveargument from Secretary of State William
H. Seward to give up Fort Sumter and to make a symbolic
stand for the Union at Fort Pickens. Pickens or Sumter was one
of the first decisions Lincoln was forced to make. Why Seward
argued for Pickens, and why Lincoln rejected his advice, needs
a new appraisal. The course and fate of the secession movement
would be determined in part by this decision.
While the truce of Pickens was being worked out, Senator
Seward was in Washington acting as untitled head of the Re-
publican party and self-designated savior of the Union. Among
his other self-appointed chores, he stated that “I have assumed
a sort of dictatorship for defense” 8 Seward relied for military
advice on Captain Montgomery C. Meigs. 9 They had been con-
versing and corresponding since the early 1850s. Captain Meigs
had looked to Seward as an ally in his work on the Capitol
dome, and he had served in Florida long enough to develop a
special interest in her forts. As early as November 1860, he had
written to General Winfield Scott urging that Florida forts
needed safeguarding because they were ripe for plucking. 10
F o r  f u r t h e r  o p i n i o n  t h a t  P i c k e n s  c o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  t a k e n ,  s e e
Julien C. Yonge, “Pensacola in the War for Southern Independence,”
Florida Historical Quarterly, XXXVII (January-April 1959), 359.
8. Henry W. Temple, “William Seward,” in Samuel Flagg Bemis, The
American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, 10 vols. (New York,
1928), VII, 19.
9. This relationship was noted by Gideon Welles, Frederic Bancroft, and
others, but not analyzed.
10. Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, 70-71.
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General Scott did not respond to Meigs’ request. However,
Seward did act to reinforce Fort Pickens as soon as he was in
a position to do so. He used as his agent the same Captain
Meigs who had noted to him in a letter written in July 1860,
that “I have never spoken with you without feeling strength-
ened in patriotism and devotion to the right and hope that in
all my future career I may be able to merit and to retain the
approbation which has thus far encouraged me.” 11  Seward’s
Fort Pickens policy was definitely determined by the advice of
Meigs, who received not just approbation but a generalship
several months after successfully playing a role for Seward in
the future Fort Pickens reinforcement.
While Lincoln remained in Sprinfigeld, Illinois, Seward was
in Washington, and he was looked upon as spokesman for the
incoming administration. His advice to the President-elect in the
eventful January days was that Lincoln would meet a hostile
confederacy when inaugurated and would have to “reduce it by
force or conciliation.” 12 Seward argued that “every thought that
we think ought to be conciliatory, forbearing and paternal.” 13
Seward had chosen the path of conciliator, though not wanting
to be called a compromiser of principle. He tried to disregard
advice given to him by Northerners, like Charles Francis Adams,
who advised against compromising even one inch, for “Slavery
and Freedom can no more harmonize in a Republican govern-
ment than an acid and alkali in a bottle. One or the other, after
a struggle, predominates, but first a struggle will ensue.” 14
Thurlow Weed, Seward’s mentor, added his advice that Fort
Sumter must be provisioned in order not to provide the dis-
grace of retreat. 15 In contrast, Henry Dana Ward advised giving
up Fort Sumter because “the union feeling both north and
south is strong enough to crush out secession if it can only have







M. C. Meigs to William H. Seward, July 2, 1860, William H. Seward
Collection, Rush Rhees Library, University of Rochester. Hereinafter re-
ferred to as Seward Papers. See also background correspondence re-
vealing Meigs-Seward relationships, August 14, 1856, February 11, De-
cember 12, 1857.
Seward to Lincoln, January 27, 1861, Papers of Abraham Lincoln, Li-
brary of Congress. Hereinafter referred to a Lincoln Papers.
Ibid.
Charles Francis Adams to Seward, February 9, 1861, Seward Papers.
Thurlow Weed to Seward, March 12, 1861, Seward Papers.
Henry Dana Ward to Seward, March 9, 1861, Seward Papers.
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away as New Orleans expressing the hope that he would be
the leading conciliator to give the southern union men a chance
to have their influence felt. 17 This latter advice, Seward pursued
with great diligence. He was the chief contact man with a group
of southern statesmen attempting to find a peaceful means of
resolving the impending conflict before the inauguration of
Lincoln. 18  And he had urged just after the Florida and other
southern senators left the senate that their committee member-
ship be reserved for them, so they could resume the seats when-
ever they wished. 19
After March 4, real confusion existed as to whether the
Pickens truce was still in effect. 20 The truce had been strained
for some time even before Lincoln’s inauguration. Upon Lieu-
tenant Slemmer’s complaint, Colonel Chase had stopped erect-
ing batteries aimed in the direction of Fort Pickens. However,
Chase’s successor, General Braxton Bragg, used the truce inter-
lude to build batteries, to enlarge the army to 5,000 well-trained
men, and to manufacture shot and shell. He procured $40,000
which he used to attempt to gain Fort Pickens through bribing
federal troops.22 Bragg took such actions “as a means of defense,
and especially so under the threats of the new administration.” 23
It has also been shown that Jefferson Davis hoped to do at
Pickens what Lincoln has been accused of doing at Sumter-
maneuvering the other side to fire the first shot. 24 But Pickens
could only be captured by taking the offensive initiative of a
ladder assault. War thus came to Fort Sumter, according to one
historian, “only because the Confederates were neither subtle
enough nor strong enough to begin at Fort Pickens.” 25
17. See, for example, Thomas S. Bacon to Seward, February 17, 1861, Seward
Papers. Glyndon P. Van Deusen, William H. Seward (New York, 1967),
276-77, notes that John A. Gilmer, North Carolina member of Congress,
was a significant influence on Seward’s acceptance of this argument.
18. Frederic Bancroft, Life of William H. Seward, 2 vols. (Gloucester, 1899),
II, 16, credits Seward “almost alone” with saving the Union on March
4.
19. Occie Clubs, “Stephen Russell Mallory, The Elder” (M.A. thesis, Uni-
versity of Florida, 1936), 219.
20. Convincing information exists that both sides were being less than
honest on the question. Tilley, Lincoln Takes Command,  and Mc-
Whiney, Braxton Bragg.
21. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 1, 359. See pages 360-65, for troubles in
keeping the truce.
22. Davis, Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, 112-13.
23. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 1, 362.
24. Grady McWhiney, Braxton Bragg, I, 167-69, 172-73.
25. Ibid., 173.
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Meanwhile, the federals near Pensacola acted consistent
with the truce while Washington leaders were deciding when
to break it. Major Tower, aboard the Sabine off Pensacola,
informed Captain Meigs on March 27 that he went in and out
of Fort Pickens whenever he chose, but did not reside there
because Captain H. A. Adams on the Brooklyn and Lieutenant
Slemmer thought it might be considered a violation of the
truce. 26  Lieutenant Slemmer tried to maintain the truce spirit
by returning all runaway Negroes who sought freedom and pro-
tection in Fort Pickens. 27
In Washington, however, the decision to break the truce by
reinforcing Pickens had already been made. General Scott on
March 12 and directed the troops on the Brooklyn to disembark.
His order reached Pensacola on March 31, but Captain Adams
would not accept an army order. A naval authorization to
land the troops was not received until April 12, the day Fort
Sumter was attacked. While General Scott was ordering the
Brooklyn to land troops, Seward was also involved in organizing
reinforcements. Seward had received advice from Captain Meigs
that “Porter should be ordered to take the Powhatan and sail
from N. Y. into Pensacola Harbor at once.” 28 Seward took his
advice, and during a conference Meigs and Seward had with
Lincoln, Seward secured the President’s consent to order the
Powhatan fitted out to reinforce Fort Pickens without the
knowledge of Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles. This created
a crisis because just as the Powhatan was ready to sail, Welles
ordered it retained for Sumter. Meigs telegraphed to Seward
from New York City: “What is to be done?” 29 The issue was
supposedly straightened out in Welles‘ favor in a meeting with
Lincoln, but because Seward countermanded a presidential
26. Meigs to Seward, mistakingly dated March 1, 1861, Seward Papers.
27. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 1, 362.
28. Meigs to Seward, March 1, 1861, Seward Papers. Colonel Harvey Brown
was actually given command with Captain Meigs accompanying him.
See Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 1, 365-66. Allan Nevins, War For
the Union (New York, 1959), thought Seward wanted to give up both
Sumter and Pickens, but Van Deusen, Seward, 600, disagrees with this
thesis.
29. Meigs to Seward, April 5, 1861, Seward Papers. Thornton Kirkland
Lothrop, William Henry Seward (Boston, 1899), 235-36, erroneously
claims that Seward had little or nothing to do with the Powhatan
incident. Meigs’ diary explanation of these incidents is given in “General
M. C. Meigs on the conduct of the Civil War,” American Historical Re-
view, XXVI (January 1921), 285-303.
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order with his own signature, the Powhatan continued on April
6 to reinforce Pickens.
Seward had given Captain Meigs $10,000 cash to buy pro-
visions and to pave the way for reinforcement. 30  Apparently
Seward had a special slush fund with which to run the navy. He
was, without question, the individual chiefly responsible for push-
ing and arranging the reinforcement of Fort Pickens. Secretary
Welles, petulant about this state department intrusion into
navy jurisdiction, accused Seward of trying to divert ships from
Sumter to Pickens. 31  The Brooklyn and Powhatan incidents
were classical examples of the state, navy, and war departments
following the Biblical injunction of “not letting thy right hand
know what thy left hand doeth.”
Lincoln’s decision to reinforce Pickens was based upon Se-
ward’s urging and Meig’s advice, but was not a fulfillment of
Seward’s desired policy. Seward had argued for several weeks
that Pickens and not Sumter be reinforced. On March 15 he
wrote out his arguments for the President, still urging that
conciliation was the only feasible and promising stance. Seward
felt that it would be ‘unwise and inhuman” not to attempt to
provision Fort Sumter if it could be done peacefully. 32  But
Seward was convinced that the attempt would “provoke con-
flict, and probably initiate a civil war.” 33  He argued that
Sumter was being held only because as United States property
it was “a monument of their authority and sovereignty,” but
that it was useless as a base of operations. 34 Seward was in no
way alone in urging Lincoln to give up Sumter. Five members
of the cabinet expressed the same point of view on March 15;






Meigs to Seward, May 10, 1861, Seward Papers. Meigs returned $6,229.50
to Seward.
John T. Moore, Introduction, Diary of Gideon Welles (Boston, 1911),
21ff. Welles’ later Galaxy article charges against Seward are included in
his Lincoln and Seward (Freeport, 1874). In the literature on this sub-
ject, no notice has been taken of the fact that Welles was willing to
give up ten ships to the revenue service on March 20, 1861, including
the Powhatan and three ships in Pensacola, the Brooklyn, Sabine, and
Wyandotte. See Welles to Lincoln, March 20, 1861, Lincoln Papers.
Welles shows complete naivete about giving up the ships needed for
defense of Pickens and destroys his argument that the loss of the
Powhatan to Pickens doomed the Sumter expedition to failure.
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next two weeks all but Seward were persuaded to supply the
South Carolina fortress. Only Montgomery Blair opposed pro-
visioning Pickens. General Scott suggested that Lincoln relin-
quish Pickens as a conciliatory gesture. All of the President’s
advisors, even Seward, were giving up hope of solving the seces-
sion crisis by conciliation. 35 Seward, after the March 29 defeat
of his viewpoint in the Cabinet, strongly set forth in a memo-
randum to Lincoln his belief that Sumter and Pickens were
different situations:  
My system is built upon this idea as a ruling one, namely
that we must
Change the question before the Public from one upon
Slavery, or about Slavery
for a question upon Union or Disunion
In other words, from what would be regarded as a
Party question to one of Patriotism or Union
The Occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although
not in fact a slavery, or a party question is so regarded.
Witness, the temper manifested by the Republicans in the
Free States, and even by Union men in the South.
I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for chang-
ing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last Administra-
tion created the necessity.
For the rest. I would simultaneously defend and rein-
force all the Forts in the Gulf, and have the Navy recalled
from foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put
the Island of Key West under Martial Law.
This will raise distinctly the question of Union or Dis-
union. I would maintain every fort and possession in the
South. 36 
Lincoln answered Seward immediately: “Again, I do not
perceive how the re-inforcement of Fort Sumter would be done
on a slavery, or party issue, while that of Fort Pickens would be
on a more national, and patriotic one.” 37
35. Salmon P. Chase revealed that the cabinet members’ change of mind
was based on the conviction that peaceful solutions were no longer
feasible. See David Donald, ed., Inside Lincoln’s Cabinet: The Civil
War Diaries of Salmon P. Chase (New York, 1954), 10.
36. Roy P. Basler, ed., Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 8 vols. (New
Brunswick, 1953), IV, 317.
37. Ibid., IV, 316. Patrick Sowle, “A Reappraisal of Sewards’ Memorandum
of April 1, 1816, to Lincoln,” Journal of Southern History, XXXIII
(May 1967), 234 ff., corrects the Bancroft story by revealing that Seward,
Thurlow Weed, and Henry J. Raymond, editor of the New York Times,
expected Lincoln to approve the memorandum and planned to publish
the results and push Seward’s leadership.
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The reason usually advanced why Seward wanted to give
up Sumter and make a stand at Pickens stresses political power
relations of Seward with Lincoln. Seward had fully expected
to become President and did not wholly respect the gangling
backwoods upstart who had taken his job. Seward had played
a role before the inauguration which he intended to continue-
running the government behind the figure of a President
he considered much less capable than himself. When the rest of
the cabinet turned against his advice on March 29, Seward’s
role in the administration and his political reputation were at
stake. He had committed himself prematurely by statements to
Southerners and Northerners that Sumter would be abandoned,
so the decision to reinforce that fort was now extremely em-
barassing. Therefore, according to Frederic Bancroft, chief ex-
ponent of this interpretation, Seward presented to the President
as “A last, desperate effort” his thoughts on domestic and for-
eign policy, which “resembled a reckless invention of a mind
driven to desperate extremes, as a sole means of escape from
ruin.” 38 Traditionally interpreted, Seward’s political role was
at stake and this is supposed to explain his Pickens policy, even
if he never admitted it himself. Seward, however, offered several
reasons for his Pickens policy which have not been seriously
analyzed.
Seward’s desire to reinforce Pickens and let the southern
forces have Sumter was due in part to practical military con-
siderations. He believed that Pickens was defensible and that
Sumter could not be reinforced and defended. Since there were
not enough troops and ships to protect all military properties,
what was available should be committed to Pickens. General
Scott sometimes supported this position. Scott, very old, very
fat, and very inconsistent, argued at one time during these
crucial months that all forts should be reinforced and defended
and also argued that all forts should be abandoned. Even so,
a significant number of military advisors, including Captain
Meigs of course, backed Seward’s belief that the defense of
Pickens was feasible, while the defense of Sumter was not. Pick-
ens was defensible with few men in the fort as long as aided
38. Bancroft, Seward, 132-34. Van Deusen’s superior biography does not
analyze Seward in respect to the subject of this article.
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by enough ships and men available nearby. 39
Another reason Seward advanced for choosing Pickens was
symbolic. Lincoln dismissed the difference in symbolic ingredi-
ents rather curtly, and as a result so have past commentators.
But Seward seriously advanced the idea of symbolically exchang-
ing Pickens for Sumter. To him, the question with any federal
fort was not just one of property, it involved the principle of
union itself. Seward had already tried to convince Lincoln that
Sumter was worthwhile to the Union only as a symbol. But to
Seward Pickens was also a symbol, and it was more useful than
Sumter because it was less explosive, more defensible, and more
necessary due to the disturbances in Santo Domingo, Mexico,
and Texas. The Confederate Congress had already expressed the
South’s desire to secure both Sumter and Pickens. But from
Seward’s point of view Pickens could become a purer symbol
of the Union and the war could be limited, especially if Sam
Houston managed to swing Texas with the Union. Pickens was
a more smoldering issue and afforded the extra t ime that
Seward and the peace-unionists wanted.
No deep thinking into the uses of religious or national
symbolisms preceded Seward’s attempt to save the Union by
substitution of symbols. Indeed, Seward’s religious attitudes were
superficial. Instead, the politician had manipulated national
symbols as part of his learned habit on the stump. He was
correct in viewing a federal fort to be as much a symbol of the
Union as the American flag itself. However, the rebel leaders
from January to April 1861, were taking the initiative in choos-
ing where the symbolic confrontation would take place. Con-
federate leaders rejected Pickens by proposing and abiding by
the truce of Pickens. This is the real significance of the truce.
In the meantime, Sumter had become more and more an inflama-
tory situation, and the eyes of the nation were riveted on Charles-
ton harbor. General Beauregard took command and the people
of both sections were aroused. Fort Sumter became the sym-
bol because both sides were more emotionally committed there.
Seward’s April 1 memorandum to Lincoln was also con-
cerned with foreign policy questions. Not only was this his chief
39. Lengthy analyses of Pickens’ defense needs were provided Seward in
letters from Meigs, April 18, 1861, and from Washington, May 17, 18,
1861, Seward Papers.
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concern as secretary of state, but months before assuming office
he had entertained foreign policy or foreign war as a solution
to internal stress. 40  And the day before his memorandum, he
had received information that Spain was starting a possible
military action into Santo Domingo. A revolutionary junta had
proclaimed for Spain, and Seward expected it to try to annex
the island. In direct response to this and the European threat to
Mexico, both areas even then being of primary concern under
the Monroe Doctrine, the secretary of state reacted by arguing
that the fleet should be brought back from foreign waters and
relocated in the Gulf of Mexico. Explanations were to be de-
manded, and a foreign war was contemplated. In this context,
Fort Pickens assumed an even larger significance to Seward.
To the revisionist historians of the twentieth century who are
examining the relationship of foreign war to domestic stress,
the argument that Seward advanced becomes even more mean-
ingful. 41
In the great debate over the crisis of 1861, Fort Sumter
looms large, and Fort Pickens figures only as an attempted
antidote. Lincoln has often been accused of attempting to pro-
voke the South to fire the first shot at Sumter. 42 Seward is looked
upon more favorably, partly because he was right about the in-
ability of the Union to reinforce Sumter. But the converse side of
this conclusion is not necessarily correct. Seward’s conciliatory
policy, including substituting Pickens for Sumter, had little
chance of success. His attempt to conciliate had a very bad press
in the South. 43 “Higher Law” Seward was not trusted as “the
great pacificator.” And he offered no compromise; all he offered
was a last-chance symbolic substitution of forts. Lincoln was cor-
rect in curtly writing that he did “not perceive” how it would
work. By overcommitting himself too late to a too superficial
trick of substituting Pickens for Sumter, Seward failed in his





Van Deusen, Seward, 247-48.
Recent revisionist writers on foreign war as a solution to domestic crisis
inc lude  Wal te r  LaFeber ,  T h e  N e w  E m p i r e :  A n  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f
American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Ithaca, 1963).
For an example, see Charles W. Ramsdell, “Lincoln and Fort Sumter,”
Journal of Southern History, III (August 1937), 260-88.
Dwight Lowell Dumond, Southern Editorials on Secession (Gloucester,
1931), 164-67, 395-97, 404-06, 411-13.
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The opening of war over Fort Sumter did not end discus-
sion about Fort Pickens’ role during the crisis days. The per-
sonalities involved provide a denouement. Seward’s Pickens
policy came to public view in a postwar debate forced by
Gideon Welles. Not only in his Diary, but in other publications,
Welles rehashed the Sumter-Pickens debate. He claimed that
Lincoln and his cabinet knew nothing about the truce of
Pickens when first in office. Since Seward was in Turkey at the
time, General Meigs, the man so well rewarded for his Fort
Pickens role, came to his friend’s public defense with evidence
that should have convinced even Mr. Welles. 44
One other personality involved in the Fort Pickens incident
suffered even more criticism than Seward. Stephen R. Mallory
had also attempted to avoid war through a Pickens policy even
though subjected “to the odium of the extremists.” 45  This
attack on him for the truce rankled Mallory so much that he
wrote to his wife from prison after the war about how his
“interference to prevent the attack on Fort Pickens brought
down the thunders of denunciation.” 46 Mrs. Mallory was appar-
ently so much concerned with local criticism that, while still in
Bridgeport, Connecticut, she wrote to him in Pensacola to ask
whether the town was still against him for the Pickens truce. 47
Mallory responded to this question by saying, “You ask how
the people treat me. Kindly, I think, as much as their condition
and nature permit.” He indicated that at a public meeting, “they
called me out most heartedly.” 48
If the Pensacola public called him out most heartedly, Se-
ward generously helped Mallory out of prison. As soon as he
was put in jail, Mallory wrote to Seward for support in gaining
a pardon. He also asked his wife to visit both Seward and Presi-






Meigs to Seward, April 6, 1871, Seward Papers. Meigs wrote to explain
to Seward what evidence he was gathering for publications against
Welles’ Galaxy article.
Mallory to his wife, June 12, 1865, P.K. Yonge Library of Florida
History, University of Florida, Gainesville. Occie Clubbs, “Stephen
Russell Mallory, The Elder,” provides a powerful defense of Mallory
against his critics, revising his reputation in a manner similar to and
amplified by Joseph T. Durkin, Stephen R. Mallory: Confederate Navy
Chief (Chapel Hill, 1954).
Ibid.
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whom my relations have ever been kind and cordial.” 49 Seward
did all that he could as “proof of an old esteem,” 50 and Mallory
appreciated the kindness shown. In a letter to his wife he noted
with a tone of appreciation that Seward had removed his father-
in-law, Don Francisco Moreno, as Spanish counsel in Pensacola
for causes only of “expedience,” overlooking charges that Mo-
reno had helped the Confederates cause. 51 The day after Mallory
officially received his pardon, he wrote to thank Seward for his
“interposition,” stating in his usual Victorian fashion that, “I
trust, my dr. Sir, that any who may bear a drop of my blood
in his veins may, in years to come, regard himself as having
‘eaten your salt,’ and as owing a debt of gratitude to your pos-
terity, to be loyally, faithfully shown.” 52 Thus, Pensacola’s Mal-
lory, who did all he could to peacefully bring about secession
from the Union, expressed his great regard for Seward, who did
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William C. Holbrook, A Narrative of the Services of the Officers and
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Mallory to Seward, October 1, 1867, Seward Papers. A comparison of
this letter with one to President Johnson (Mallory to Andrew Johnson,
October 1, 1867, Papers of Andrew Johnson, Library of Congress,
indicates how clearly Mallory felt a debt to Seward for his pardon.
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